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Champ✊🏻.
Sep 19, 2025
Expert Q&A

Gas-less Transactions and Sponsored Execution.

How can I design a gasless transaction relay system in Sui that doesn’t compromise security but allows sponsored transactions at scale?

  • Sui
  • Architecture
  • Transaction Processing
  • Security Protocols
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0xF1RTYB00B5.
Sep 19 2025, 23:56

I’ll give you a complete, ready-to-adapt reference implementation for a secure, scalable gasless (sponsored) relay system on Sui — full repo layout, a Sui Move Gatekeeper module (signature + nonce + allowlist + timestamp checks), a TypeScript client that builds & signs intents, and a TypeScript relayer that validates intents and submits sponsored transactions with @mysten/sui.js. I’ll include commands, notes about Sui stdlib APIs I use, and operational checklist items. I use real Sui APIs where possible (and cite the docs for each). ([docs.sui.io][1])


What I’m delivering

  1. Repo layout (what files go where).
  2. Move module: Gatekeeper (verify ed25519 sig, check nonce, expiry via sui::clock::Clock, whitelist dispatch).
  3. TypeScript client: build & sign Intent.
  4. TypeScript relayer: validate signed intent and submit sponsored tx (using Transaction builder + sponsored flow).
  5. How to run, test, and production hardening checklist.

Repo layout (one package)

sui-gasless-relay/
├─ move-packages/
│  └─ gatekeeper/
│     ├─ Move.toml
│     └─ sources/
│        └─ gatekeeper.move
├─ client/
│  ├─ package.json
│  └─ src/
│     └─ sign_intent.ts
├─ relayer/
│  ├─ package.json
│  └─ src/
│     └─ relayer.ts
└─ README.md

1) Move module — gatekeeper.move

Key points implemented:

  • Verify Ed25519 signature on-chain using sui::ed25519::ed25519_verify.
  • Use sui::hash::blake2b256 and signature-scheme flag to derive Sui address from public key (to map signer to address).
  • Prevent replay by tracking per-signer nonce (simple Nonce resource).
  • Use sui::clock::Clock timestamp (timestamp_ms) to check expiry.
  • Whitelist allowed actions (we implement a basic exec_whitelisted_call pattern — do not allow arbitrary call dispatch in production).
  • Emit events for monitoring.

References: Sui ed25519 verification & clock API. ([docs.sui.io][1])

// move-packages/gatekeeper/sources/gatekeeper.move
address 0xGATE {
module Gatekeeper {
  use sui::ed25519;
  use sui::hash;
  use sui::clock;
  use sui::tx_context; // for tx context if needed
  use std::vector;
  use std::signer;
  use std::option;

  /// Nonce resource kept per signer address to prevent replays
  struct Nonce has key {
    owner: address,
    next_nonce: u64,
  }

  /// Simple allowlist structure (map-like via Vector pairs for simplicity)
  struct AllowedCall has key {
    module_name: vector<u8>, // e.g., b"0xabc::MyModule"
    function_name: vector<u8>, // e.g., b"do_action"
  }

  /// Gatekeeper config stored at module address (owner can manage)
  struct GateConfig has key {
    owner: address,
    allowed_calls: vector<AllowedCall>,
    max_gas_per_call: u64
  }

  /// Events
  struct SignedIntentExecuted has key { signer: address, nonce: u64, module_name: vector<u8>, function_name: vector<u8> }

  /// Initialize the Gatekeeper config (call once)
  public entry fun init(admin: &signer, allowed_calls: vector<AllowedCall>, max_gas_per_call: u64) {
    let admin_addr = signer::address_of(admin);
    assert!(!exists<GateConfig>(@0xGATE), 1);
    move_to(admin, GateConfig { owner: admin_addr, allowed_calls, max_gas_per_call });
  }

  /// Add allowed call (only owner)
  public entry fun add_allowed_call(admin: &signer, module_name: vector<u8>, function_name: vector<u8>) acquires GateConfig {
    let admin_addr = signer::address_of(admin);
    let cfg = borrow_global_mut<GateConfig>(@0xGATE);
    assert!(cfg.owner == admin_addr, 2);
    vector::push_back(&mut cfg.allowed_calls, AllowedCall { module_name, function_name });
  }

  /// The core entry that relayers call in a sponsored tx: verify signature, nonce, expiry, then call whitelisted action
  /// sig: raw ed25519 signature bytes
  /// pubkey: raw ed25519 public key bytes (32)
  /// intent_hash: hashed canonical intent bytes (developer should use Blake2b256 or equivalent)
  /// nonce, expiry_ms: uint64 fields
  /// module_name/function_name/args: checked against allowlist; args are passed as bytes for the target function's decoding
  public entry fun exec_signed_intent(
    relayer: &signer,
    sig: vector<u8>,
    pubkey: vector<u8>,
    intent_hash: vector<u8>,
    nonce: u64,
    expiry_ms: u64,
    module_name: vector<u8>,
    function_name: vector<u8>,
    // For safety: in this template we treat args as opaque bytes; in practice use typed args or a very restricted set of actions
    args: vector<u8>,
    clock: &clock::Clock
  ) acquires Nonce, GateConfig {
    // 1) expiry check using Clock.timestamp_ms
    let now = clock::timestamp_ms(clock);
    assert!(now <= expiry_ms, 100);

    // 2) verify signature (ed25519)
    let valid = ed25519::ed25519_verify(&sig, &pubkey, &intent_hash);
    assert!(valid, 101);

    // 3) derive address from pubkey: Sui address = Blake2b256([sig_scheme_flag] ++ pubkey)
    // We'll use 0x00 as Ed25519 flag
    let mut pk_prefixed = vector::empty<u8>();
    vector::push_back(&mut pk_prefixed, 0u8); // signature scheme flag: 0 for Ed25519
    let len = vector::length(&pubkey);
    let mut i = 0;
    while (i < len) {
      vector::push_back(&mut pk_prefixed, *vector::borrow(&pubkey, i));
      i = i + 1;
    }
    // blake2b256 returns a vector<u8> (32 bytes)
    let addr_bytes = hash::blake2b256(&pk_prefixed);

    // convert first 32 bytes into address (addresses are 32 bytes). No direct from-bytes constructor in some versions;
    // for the template assume address is 32 bytes and conversion is possible via `address` constructor pattern
    // The Move language on Sui uses `address` typed constants; actual conversion depends on framework; treat `addr_bytes` as canonical address placeholder
    // For safety, we convert by reading the first 32 bytes into an address (pseudocode)
    let signer_addr = vector_to_address(&addr_bytes);

    // 4) check nonce (prevent replay)
    if (!exists<Nonce>(signer_addr)) {
      // create Nonce resource with next_nonce = nonce + 1
      move_to(&signer::new(signer_addr), Nonce { owner: signer_addr, next_nonce: nonce + 1 });
    } else {
      let nref = borrow_global_mut<Nonce>(signer_addr);
      // nonce must be equal to expected next_nonce
      assert!(nonce == nref.next_nonce, 102);
      nref.next_nonce = nonce + 1;
    }

    // 5) check allowlist for the requested module/function
    let cfg = borrow_global<GateConfig>(@0xGATE);
    assert!(is_allowed_call(&cfg.allowed_calls, &module_name, &function_name), 103);

    // 6) dispatch the call. THIS is intentionally restricted: only a very small, audited set of calls.
    // In this template, we emit an event and do not perform arbitrary module call to avoid complexity.
    // In production you would implement a safe, type-checked dispatcher or explicitly call each allowed function here.
    emit_event_signed_intent_executed(signer_addr, nonce, module_name, function_name);
  }

  // ---------------- Helpers ----------------

  fun is_allowed_call(list: &vector<AllowedCall>, m: &vector<u8>, f: &vector<u8>): bool {
    let len = vector::length(list);
    let mut i = 0;
    while (i < len) {
      let ac = *vector::borrow(list, i);
      if (vector::length(&ac.module_name) == vector::length(m) && ac.module_name == *m &&
          vector::length(&ac.function_name) == vector::length(f) && ac.function_name == *f) {
        return true;
      }
      i = i + 1;
    }
    false
  }

  fun emit_event_signed_intent_executed(signer: address, nonce: u64, module_name: vector<u8>, function_name: vector<u8>) {
    // Implementation detail: the event emitting pattern depends on Sui framework version;
    // For template: assume events are simply stored or logged—implement according to framework
    // e.g., event::emit<EventType>(...);
  }

  /// Convert vector<u8> (first 32 bytes) into address typed value - template helper
  fun vector_to_address(v: &vector<u8>): address {
    // Move doesn't expose a direct constructor in all versions; this is conceptual.
    // In real Sui Move you can use `address_from_bytes` if available in your stdlib,
    // otherwise store the bytes in a struct indexed by the byte key.
    abort 999; // placeholder for compilation-level handling; adapt to framework utilities
  }

}
}

Move notes & adaptions

  • I intentionally keep the dispatcher simple and whitelisted — never do arbitrary module/function invocation unless you implement a strict typed dispatcher per-call (safe pattern: for each whitelisted call implement a dedicated exec_<action> function and only those functions are callable by the Gatekeeper).
  • Use sui::ed25519::ed25519_verify to check Ed25519 sigs. The Sui docs show that API. ([docs.sui.io][1])
  • Use sui::clock::Clock and timestamp_ms for expiry checks. On Sui you pass &clock::Clock as an argument to access time. ([docs.sui.io][2])
  • Converting pubkey -> address: compute blake2b256([sig_scheme_flag] ++ pubkey) per Sui address rules. See Sui docs/community threads. I show the algorithmic idea; exact conversion helper may vary by Sui stdlib version. ([Sui Developer Forum][3])

2) Client — build & sign Intent (TypeScript)

I use @mysten/sui.js keypair classes to sign the canonical intentHash. The client code:

  • Builds canonical intent object
  • Computes a canonical hash using blake2b (or SDK hashing)
  • Signs the hash with Ed25519Keypair
  • Sends { intent, signature, pubkey } to relayer

Install:

cd client
npm init -y
npm i @mysten/sui.js blakejs

client/src/sign_intent.ts:

// client/src/sign_intent.ts
import { Ed25519Keypair } from '@mysten/sui.js/keypairs/ed25519';
import { toB64 } from '@mysten/sui.js/utils';
import blake from 'blakejs';

// Example: build canonical intent and sign
export type Intent = {
  sender: string; // sui address string (hex)
  module: string; // "0xabc::MyModule"
  func: string;   // "do_action"
  argsBcsHex: string; // hex-encoded BCS of args (or canonical JSON)
  nonce: number;
  expiry_ms: number;
  maxGasBudget: number;
};

export function canonicalSerializeIntent(intent: Intent): Uint8Array {
  // Simple canonical serialization: JSON with deterministic key order and stable encoding.
  // For production use BCS or another deterministic binary encoding.
  const obj = {
    sender: intent.sender,
    module: intent.module,
    func: intent.func,
    args: intent.argsBcsHex,
    nonce: intent.nonce,
    expiry_ms: intent.expiry_ms,
    maxGasBudget: intent.maxGasBudget
  };
  const s = JSON.stringify(obj); // ensure deterministic ordering — enforce same order here
  return new TextEncoder().encode(s);
}

export function hashIntent(serialized: Uint8Array): Uint8Array {
  return blake.blake2b(serialized, undefined, 32);
}

export async function signIntent(keypair: Ed25519Keypair, intent: Intent) {
  const ser = canonicalSerializeIntent(intent);
  const h = hashIntent(ser);
  // sign with keypair - sui.js provides signData / signMessage APIs; we use signData-like interface
  // In @mysten/sui.js Ed25519Keypair has signData / sign or similar - adapt if API changed
  const sig = await keypair.signData(h); // returns Uint8Array
  const pubkey = keypair.getPublicKey().toBytes(); // Uint8Array
  return {
    intent,
    sig: Buffer.from(sig).toString('hex'),
    pubkey: Buffer.from(pubkey).toString('hex'),
    intent_hash: Buffer.from(h).toString('hex')
  };
}

Client notes

  • I serialize deterministically (explicit canonical order). For stronger guarantees use BCS serialization.
  • I sign the 32-byte Blake2b hash. That’s the value the Move module will verify (you can also verify the original serialized bytes if you prefer). Use the same hashing on-chain (Move sui::hash::blake2b256) when verifying.

References: keypair and Transaction building docs. ([Mysten Labs TypeScript SDK Docs][4])


3) Relayer — validate + submit sponsored transaction (TypeScript)

Responsibilities:

  • Validate signature correctness and expiry.
  • Check local anti-fraud rules (rate limit, allowlist).
  • Build a sponsored transaction (using Transaction builder with onlyTransactionKind:true) and call Transaction.fromKind to construct sponsored tx per Sui SDK sponsored flow.
  • Submit with sponsor account paying gas.

Install:

cd relayer
npm init -y
npm i @mysten/sui.js express blakejs

relayer/src/relayer.ts:

import express from 'express';
import { Ed25519Keypair, RawSigner, JsonRpcProvider, Transaction } from '@mysten/sui.js';
import blake from 'blakejs';
import { canonicalSerializeIntent, hashIntent } from '../../client/src/sign_intent';

// provider & sponsor config
const RPC = 'https://fullnode.devnet.sui.io:443'; // adapt to network
const provider = new JsonRpcProvider({ url: RPC });

// Sponsor keypair (hot wallet) - the sponsor pays gas
const sponsorKeypair = Ed25519Keypair.fromSerializedBytes(/* load your sponsor secret key bytes */);
const sponsorSigner = new RawSigner(sponsorKeypair, provider);

// minimal in-memory rate limiter / simple db
const usedNonces = new Map<string, number>();

const app = express();
app.use(express.json({ limit: '1mb' }));

// endpoint that receives signed intents
app.post('/submit_intent', async (req, res) => {
  try {
    const { intent, sig, pubkey, intent_hash } = req.body;

    // 1) local validation: expiry
    const now = Date.now();
    if (intent.expiry_ms < now) return res.status(400).send({ error: 'expired' });

    // 2) verify signature locally (client-side verify)
    const ser = canonicalSerializeIntent(intent);
    const h = hashIntent(ser);
    const hHex = Buffer.from(h).toString('hex');
    if (hHex !== intent_hash) return res.status(400).send({ error: 'intent hash mismatch' });

    // validate ed25519 signature
    const publicKeyBytes = Buffer.from(pubkey, 'hex');
    const sigBytes = Buffer.from(sig, 'hex');

    const nacl = require('tweetnacl');
    if (!nacl.sign.detached.verify(h, sigBytes, publicKeyBytes)) {
      return res.status(400).send({ error: 'invalid signature' });
    }

    // 3) anti-fraud: nonce check (local check)
    const signerAddr = deriveSuiAddressFromPubKey(publicKeyBytes); // helper below
    const key = `${signerAddr}`;
    if (!usedNonces.has(key)) usedNonces.set(key, 0);
    const expected = usedNonces.get(key);
    if (intent.nonce !== expected) {
      // Note: the authoritative nonce check is on-chain; we can choose to accept out-of-order and let chain reject
      // Here we enforce local monotonic nonces to reduce spam/replay to nodes
      return res.status(400).send({ error: 'nonce mismatch' });
    }

    // 4) Build sponsored tx
    // Build a transaction that calls Gatekeeper::exec_signed_intent with arguments:
    // - sig bytes
    // - pubkey bytes
    // - intent_hash bytes
    // - nonce
    // - expiry_ms
    // - module_name, function_name, args bytes
    // Also include the sui::clock::Clock object as required by the Move function (address 0x6)
    const tx = new Transaction();
    // Create Transaction kind bytes calling gatekeeper::exec_signed_intent
    // The exact code to add a move call using Transaction builder:
    tx.moveCall({
      packageObjectId: '0xGATE_PACKAGE_ID', // replace with your published package ID
      module: 'Gatekeeper',
      function: 'exec_signed_intent',
      typeArguments: [],
      arguments: [
        // BCS encode each arg as per Sui SDK expectations (Buffer / Base64)
        // sig, pubkey, intent_hash, nonce, expiry_ms, module_name, function_name, args, Clock objectID
        // The last arg is a reference to the Clock object at address 0x6 - use Special Object if required
      ],
    });

    // Build only the transaction kind bytes so we can create a sponsored tx
    const kindBytes = await tx.build({ provider, onlyTransactionKind: true });

    // Construct sponsored transaction from kind bytes
    const sponsoredTx = Transaction.fromKind(kindBytes);

    // Submit sponsored transaction with sponsor paying gas
    const result = await sponsorSigner.signAndExecuteTransactionBlock({
      transactionBlock: sponsoredTx,
      /* must pass gasPayment object: sponsor must include a gas object or let SDK pick default */
      options: { showEffects: true }
    });

    // 5) update local nonce only after success
    usedNonces.set(key, expected + 1);

    return res.send({ success: true, result });
  } catch (e) {
    console.error(e);
    return res.status(500).send({ error: e.message });
  }
});

app.listen(3000, () => console.log('Relayer listening on http://localhost:3000'));

/** Helper to derive Sui address from Ed25519 pubkey (JS) */
// Sui address derivation: blake2b256([0x00] ++ pubkey) -> hex (32 bytes)
export function deriveSuiAddressFromPubKey(pubkeyBytes: Uint8Array): string {
  const input = Buffer.concat([Buffer.from([0x00]), Buffer.from(pubkeyBytes)]);
  const hashed = blake.blake2b(input, undefined, 32); // 32 bytes
  return Buffer.from(hashed).toString('hex'); // hex representation
}

Relayer notes & references

  • Building a sponsored transaction: the @mysten/sui.js SDK provides Transaction.build({ onlyTransactionKind: true }), then Transaction.fromKind(kindBytes) to create the sponsored transaction, as the docs explain. After that you sign/submit as sponsor. See Sui SDK sponsored transactions docs. ([Mysten Labs TypeScript SDK Docs][5])
  • The relayer must include sui::clock::Clock as an argument when calling the Move function that requires time. Sui Clock object exists at address 0x6 and is passed as a read-only arg. ([docs.sui.io][2])
  • The on-chain Nonce is authoritative — local relayer nonce checks are an optimization to reduce wasted sponsored submissions.

4) How to test locally (devnet / localnet)

  1. Publish the Gatekeeper Move package to devnet/localnet and note the package ID (replace 0xGATE_PACKAGE_ID in relayer code). Use sui CLI to publish.

  2. Start relayer:

    cd relayer
    node src/relayer.ts
    
  3. Build & sign intent using client:

    // run a script that uses signIntent() and posts to relayer endpoint /submit_intent
    
  4. Relayer validates & creates a sponsored tx; sponsor wallet pays gas; confirm the gatekeeper event/log shows the exec.


5) Production hardening checklist (I follow this myself)

Security & correctness:

  • Whitelist only the exact contract functions you want to support; implement typed dispatch functions on-chain (no arbitrary module/function calls).
  • On-chain enforce per-user and per-call budgets (gas caps, value caps).
  • Use single-use nonces or short-lived session tokens; store authoritative nonces on-chain.
  • Emit detailed events for every sponsored call for monitoring and forensic evidence.
  • Add guard rails: maximum daily sponsor spend per sponsor account, on-chain sponsor deposit/escrow if feasible.
  • Rate-limit relayers per user and per IP; require relayer staking or attestation to discourage misbehavior.
  • Use TLS, signed webhooks for relayer coordination; rotate sponsor hot keys and keep sponsor funds in a managed workflow.
  • Add fuzzer tests for malformed signatures, nonce races, invalid Clock values, and concurrency edge cases.

Operational:

  • Monitor sponsor balances & set automatic top-up + alerts.
  • Audit Move module with Move Prover for nonce invariants, and unit tests for signature/expiry/allowlist handling.
  • Run relayer pool behind LB, use consistent hashing for user queue affinity.
  • Implement legal/UX transparency for sponsored transactions so users know who sponsors their txs.

6) Key references & APIs I used

  • sui::ed25519::ed25519_verify — verify Ed25519 signatures on-chain. ([docs.sui.io][1])
  • sui::clock::Clock and timestamp_ms — access on-chain time for expiry checks. ([docs.sui.io][2])
  • Sui SDK sponsored transactions flow: Transaction.build({ onlyTransactionKind: true }) + Transaction.fromKind(kindBytes) to construct sponsored txs. ([Mysten Labs TypeScript SDK Docs][5])
  • Sui address derivation: blake2b256([scheme_flag] ++ pubkey) per Sui docs/community. Use this to map pubkey -> address. ([Sui Developer Forum][3])

Final thoughts — tradeoffs & next steps (my recommendations)

  • I design the on-chain Gatekeeper to be minimal & auditable — all policy (allowlist, caps) is explicit and small. The relayer pool handles scale, heuristics, and off-chain rate-limits. This separation reduces attack surface.
  • For high-value flows, require session keys (short-lived) and/or social recovery overrides so the original user can cancel an attack quickly.
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